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The Reality of Addressing God in 
Prayer
W. Graham Monteith
[The]	 tendency	 toward	 an	 intersubjective	 pragmatics	
shows	itself	in	the	work	of	the	leading	philosopher	of	
the Scottish “Common Sense” school, Thomas Reid, 
who	 believed	 that	 the	 most	 important	 function	 of	
language is to perform “social acts” such as promising, 
commanding,	contracting,	or	testifying.1
In	 the	 above	 quotation,	 Angela	 Esterhammer	 maintains	 that	 the	
Scottish	‘Common	Sense’	school	of	the	Enlightenment	brought	about	
a	dynamic	understanding	of	 language	as	being	 social	 and	also	 as	 a	
mode	of	stating	our	 internal	beliefs.	The	purpose	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	
examine	the	nature	of	speech	in	prayer,	that	is,	we	wish	to	reach	an	
understanding	 in	 terms	 of	 speech	 act	 theory.	 The	 central	 problem	
here	is	that	anything	uttered	in	a	prayer	is	addressed	to	God	who	is	
unverifiable and is not addressed to humans who can witness the 
outcome	 of	 the	 speech	 act	 and	 be	 passive	 or	 active	 hearers	 of	 the	
prayer.	There	 is	 understandably	no	mention	of	God	or	 of	 prayer	 in	
the	writings	of	the	major	speech	act	theorists,	J.	L.	Austin	and	J.	R.	
Searle.	Coming	from	a	positivist	background,	it	is	not	surprising	that	
they	make	no	 such	mention	but	 it	 is	 possible	 to	go	 further	back	 in	
history	and	discover	a	theory	of	language	and	of	belief	that	may	make	
it	possible	to	apply	speech	act	theory	to	prayer.	
Prayer	is	addressed	to God,	whereas	theology	is	about God.	Prayer	
can	take	the	form	of	praise	or	intercession,	confession	or	blessing.	It	
is	sometimes	described	as	communion	with	God.	It	can	basically	be	
defined as the activity of communicating with a God who is believed 
to	 wish	 our	 communication	 and	 who	 responds	 in	 ways	 which	 are	
beyond	our	control.	It	is	argued	by	many	sources	that	Thomas	Reid	
T
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offered a seminal epistemological understanding of non-verifiable 
religious	 utterances	 and	 that	 when	 his	 theories	 are	 combined	 with	
some	of	the	argumentation	of	modern	commentators	it	is	possible	to	
argue	that	speech	acts	are	contained	within	prayer	and	may	be	used	to	
provide	a	descriptive	analysis.	Speech	act	theory	works	when	there	is	
evidence	that	someone	has	spoken	and	that	the	effect	of	that	speech	
can be verified by its effect on another individual or society. This is 
not	possible	in	the	case	of	prayer	because	the	effect	it	has	upon	God	
cannot be known or verified. This makes traditional speech act theory 
apparently	impotent	when	it	comes	to	analysing	prayer.	We	hope	to	
show,	however,	that	because	Reid	introduces	a	metaphysical	element	
into	speech	and	its	meaning,	we	may	be	able	to	show	that	utterances	
in	a	prayer	do	constitute	speech	acts.
Thomas	 Reid	 (1710–1796)	 was	 a	 Regent	 at	 King’s	 College,	
Aberdeen where he wrote his first major work. He began a life-
long	dispute	with	David	Hume	after	 taking	up	 a	Chair	 in	Glasgow	
and	 he	 famously	 put	 forward	 a	 theory	 of	 Common	 Sense	 which	
contradicted	Hume’s	scepticism.	Reid	offered	a	way	of	understanding	
those	internalized	beliefs	which	have	lately	become	so	important	 in	
postmodern	philosophy	and	theology.	It	will	be	argued	in	this	article	
that	the	problem	lies	in	the	inability	of	modern	speech	act	theory	to	
accommodate	 the	 metaphysical.	 The	 solution	 lies	 in	 regarding	 the	
speech	in	prayer	as	a	speech	act	as	understood	by	Reid.	There	are	four	
stages	to	the	argument.	1)	We	must	review	modern	speech	act	theory	
and	 its	 limitations	 regarding	 this	 question.	 2)	Shoshana	 Felman	 in	
her	book,	The Scandal of the Speaking Body,	can	help	to	advance	the	
argument	by	demonstrating	that	speech	acts	may	refer	to	something,	
in this case the flattery of beautiful women by Cervantes’ Don Juan, 
which is unverifiable and intrinsically subjective. 3) A review of speech 
act	theory	and	religion	will	show	that	work	has	been	undertaken	in	this	
field in relation to the notion that God speaks but not how we claim to 
speak to God. 4) It will finally be argued that Reid offers a theory of 
speech	acts,	which	when	combined	with	his	understanding	of	belief,	
shows	that	prayer	can	be	understood	as	comprising	various	sorts	of	
speech	act.	
When it comes to examining Austin, it will be sufficient to 
concentrate	 on	 his	 concept	 of	 performatives	 such	 as	 promises	 and	
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legal	prescriptions.	He	outlines	most	of	our	concerns	in	Lecture	V	of	
Doing Things With Words.	Throughout	the	book	there	is	no	mention	
of	God	or	of	prayer.	Austin	recognises	that	when	we	make	a	promise	
we	enter	into	an	act	which	entails	an	outcome	which	normally	will	be	
considered to be the fulfilment of the promise. He talks of promises 
being	‘happy’	by	which	he	means	that	they	are	kept.	Sometimes	the	
word	‘felicitous’	is	used.	In	general,	he	writes:
this	 amounted	 to	 saying,	 if	 you	 prefer	 jargon,	 that	 certain	
conditions have to be satisfied if the utterance is to be happy—
certain	things	have	to	be	so.	And	this,	it	seems	clear,	commits	
us	 to	 saying	 that	 for	 a	 certain	 performative	 utterance	 to	 be	
happy,	certain	statements	have	to be true.2
When	he	goes	on	to	talk	about	refereeing	a	cricket	match,	he	recognises	
that	a	decision	may	be	disputed	or	that	a	mistake	may	have	been	made	
but	 the	outcome	is	not	as	serious	as	breaking	a	promise.	A	promise	
as	an	act	has	certain	expected,	happy,	outcomes	which	are	dashed	by	
dishonesty	or	other	 reasons	 there	may	be	 for	breaking	promises.	 In	
the	 case	 of	 a	 promise	 its	 performative	 value	 is	 totally	 tied	 up	with	
its	conclusion.	The	choice	of	this	particular	example	provides	Austin	
with an immediate verification of a chosen performative. However, 
on	Austin’s	analysis,	no	truth	can	verify	a	performative	utterance	in	
prayer.	Thus,	the	ascription	of	the	word	‘happy’	(or	‘unhappy’	for	that	
matter)	cannot	be	made.
However,	what	if	there	is	a	way	of	moving	from	an	understanding	
of	 a	 solemn	promise	manifestly	kept	–	 to	 an	 empty	promise	which	
nevertheless	has	meaning	and	substance	–	to	a	promise	made	to	God	
which is both solemn and kept but cannot be verified? The next stage 
in	 the	 argument	 is	 to	 look	 at	 empty	promises.	Felman	 recounts	 the	
tales of Don Juan who constantly flattered women with no sincerity 
beyond	 that	 of	 the	 romantic	moment.	 It	will	 be	 contended	 that	 the	
properties	 of	God	 are	 as	 real	 as	 those	which	Don	 Juan	 admires	 in	
women,	and	 that	because	 the	properties	of	God	are	 real,	 statements	
about	 them	 have	 the	 same	 validity	 as	 other	 subjective	 statements	
which are suggestive of speech acts. Can his flattery be understood as a 
speech	act	in	that	he	was	offering	to	each	woman	some	understanding	
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of beauty and attractiveness and affirming something which she could 
bank	as	an	emotion	and	promise	for	the	future,	only	to	be	betrayed	by	
the shallowness of the affirmation? At first sight there is no truth in 
Don	Juan’s	statements	and	nothing	which	could	afford	them	the	status	
of	truth.	Felman,	however,	argues	thus:	
The source of obligation is displaced here from the first to 
the	second	and	third	persons:	“You	are	not	obliged	 to	me	…	
your beauty is your security.” The constative itself, in Don 
Juan’s	mouth,	appears	 to	be	 the	statement of a promise,	of	a	
commitment	undertaken.	Whether	constative	or	performative,	
seductive	discourse	commits	and	endebts;	but	since	the	debt	is	
contracted	here	on	the	basis	of	narcissism,	the	two	parties	to	
the	debt	are	the	woman	and	her	own	self-image.	“Your	beauty	
is your security.”3
Thus,	 because	Don	 Juan	 has	 a	 subjective	 concept	 of	 beauty	 in	 his	
mind	 and	 is	 addressing	 it	 to	 someone	who	 possesses	 that	 property	
he	 is	 not	 lying,	 however	 despicable	 his	 behaviour	 may	 be.	 “Your	
beauty is your security.” is the first step to recognising that speech 
acts	 may	 be	 addressed	 to	 subjects	 which	 have	 a	 purely	 subjective	
basis.	Schuhmann	and	Smith4	 present	 a	 fairly	 convincing	 argument	
that	 there	were	 early	 signs	 of	 speech	 act	 theory	 in	 Reid’s	writings	
but	 they	preferred	 to	concentrate	on	 the	 idea	 that	 they	were	 ‘social	
acts’	which	stressed	the	action	of	a	promise	between	two	parties	–	one	
spoken,	the	other	received.	They	make	no	mention	of	Reid’s	religious	
beliefs (which they find rather confusing) which are so important in 
the	 understanding	 of	 the	mind	 in	 the	works	 of	Reid.	Nevertheless,	
they	 stress,	 in	 common	with	most	 commentators,	 the	 social	 nature	
of	 language.	 They	 do	 suggest	 that	 Reid	 may	 have	 made	 more	 of	
insincerity and infidelity than either Austin or Searle.
Our	 intention,	 however,	 is	 to	 show	 that	 the	 belief	 that	 one	 is	
communicating	to	God	has	the	same	dynamics	as	the	above	example	
but	 that	 Reid	 offers	 a	 threefold	 understanding	 of	 language	 which	
allows	us	to	assume	that	a	speech	act	is	taking	place	in	prayer	to	a	real	
object	of	belief.	Most	 recent	 literature	 tends	 to	concentrate	on	how	
God	talks	to	humankind.	The	Bible	is	not	only	regarded	as	story	and	
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history but as prophecy and fulfilment which gives its words a living 
meaning	if	language	is	considered	to	be	the	product	of	a	living	being.	
A	prominent	philosopher	and	 theologian	who	has	dealt	with	 the	
notion	of	God’s	speech	is	Nicholas	Wolterstorff.	His	work	on	Thomas	
Reid	will	be	discussed	below	but	reference	must	be	made	to	his	Divine 
Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks.	
Wolterstorff	does	not	dwell	upon	Reid	by	name	other	than	to	remind	
his	readers	that	
Thomas	 Reid	 argued	 that	 our	 human	 constitution	 includes	
an	 inherent	 disposition	 toward	 veracity	 in	 speech	 and,	
correspondingly,	toward	credulity	in	listeners.	Such	dispositions	
are	indispensable	to	the	endurance	of	the	system.5
Alvin	Plantinga	contends	 that	religious	beliefs	are	basic	and	have	a	
reality	 in	 themselves.	He	argues	strongly	 in	 favour	of	 the	Common	
Sense	 school	 of	 philosophy.	He	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 protagonists	 of	
‘Reformed	Epistemology’	and	argues	strongly	that	beliefs	have	their	
warrant	from	the	strength	of	fundamental	beliefs	held	by	individuals	
who come together in communities to find their common ideas. 
…	Christian	belief	is	immediate;	it	is	formed	in	the	basic	way.	
It	doesn’t	proceed	by	way	of	an	argument	from,	for	example,	
the	reliability	of	Scripture	or	the	church.	…	Christian	belief	is	
basic;	furthermore,	Christian	belief	is	properly	basic	…6
His	analysis	owes	much	to	Reid	and	stresses	that	the	believer	is	both	
justified and rational in his doxastic practice. Daniel Robinson, in a 
paper	on	William	James,	points	to	that	author’s	references	to	Reid	in	
his works, and also to what ‘Reid called the “principle of veracity” 
and “the principle of credulity.”’7
The	American	 mathematician	 and	 philosopher	 William	Alston,	
however,	 presents	 the	 most	 cogent	 argument	 for	 a	 modern	 use	 of	
Thomas	Reid.	Some	accuse	Alston	of	developing	a	purely	subjective	
theory	 whilst	 others	 applaud	 his	 internalist	 or	 phenomenological	
approach.	 His	 purpose	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 doxastic	 practices	 of	
believers.	He	begins	by	quoting	many	examples	of	religious	experiences	
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from	 William	 James’	 The Varieties of Religious Experience	8	 and	
develops	an	argument	throughout	the	book	that	such	experiences	have	
an	 existence	which	 gives	 them	 substance	which	 can	 be	 understood	
as	 a	 true	doxastic	practice.	He	 is	 attracted	by	Reid’s	 commonsense	
understanding	of	perception,	which	Alston	argues	is	developed	out	of	
experience	and	understanding.	Belief	in	God	is	as	much	an	experience	
which	comes	from	a	variety	of	sources	as	any	other	belief	and	must	be	
regarded as real to the believer. In putting aside issues of verification, 
Alston	writes	of	Reid:
…	 one	 reason	 my	 account	 is	 closer	 to	 Reid’s	 is	 that	 Reid	
had	 the	 advantage	 of	 philosophizing	 before	 the	 advent	 of	
verificationist and other antirealist philosophies. Reid never 
suggests	 that	 there	 is	 anything	 unintelligible	 about	 the	 idea	
that,	for	example,	sense	perception	is	or	is	not	reliable,	or	that	
we	cannot	meaningfully	raise	 the	question	of	whether	 this	 is	
so, however difficult it may be to find a way to answer the 
question.9
We	now	come	to	the	three	elements	in	Thomas	Reid’s	understanding	
of	language	and	of	its	purpose.	First,	language	is	given	as	an	internal	
property	of	humankind;	second,	language	can	be	used	as	a	means	of	
describing	 perceived	 truths	 about	God;	 and	 third,	 language	 is	 used	
socially	as	a	form	of	speech	act	when	addressing	God.	
Reid	is	remarkably	ahead	of	his	time	in	his	conception	of	language	
and	is	acknowledged	by	some	linguists	as	such.	He	speaks	of	language	
as	being	acquired	at	a	very	early	age	at	the	breast	and	from	the	nurse.	
Language	as	a	series	of	signs	facilitates	from	an	early	age	the	ability	
to	demand	and	receive	food	and	the	necessities	of	life.	However,	the	
most	 interesting	 connection	with	modern	 linguistics	 is	 the	 homage	
paid	to	him	by	Chomsky.	Chomsky	recognised	Reid’s	understanding	
of	language	acquisition	from	an	early	age	and	gave	credit	for	his	early	
understanding.10	Both	were	internalists.	Reid	wrote:	
Some	have	thought	that	the	Origin	of	Language	among	Men	...	
has	something	in	it	very	unaccountable	and	mysterious.	Some	
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have thought that Mankind must first have been taught it by 
heaven	&	that	it	could	not	be	a	human	Invention.11
And	again;
If	nature	had	not	made	man	capable	of	such	social	operations	
of	mind,	and	furnished	him	with	a	language	to	express	them,	
he	might	think,	and	reason,	and	deliberate,	and	will;	he	might	
have	desires	and	aversions,	joy	and	sorrow;	in	a	word,	he	might	
exert	all	 those	operations	of	mind	which	 the	writers	 in	 logic	
and	 pneumatology	 have	 so	 copiously	 described;	 but,	 at	 the	
same	time,	he	would	still	be	a	solitary	being,	even	when	in	a	
crowd	…12	
Language	 achieves	 the	 social	 nature	 of	 man	 and	 gives	 to	 him	 his	
unique	qualities	of	social	intercourse.	As	a	natural	property	of	man,	
language	gives	to	us	the	opportunity	to	speak	the	truths	that	belong	to	
us	and	to	accord	to	them	the	social	reality	of	beliefs	held	in	common	
and	mutually	understood.	
Second,	Reid	makes	it	clear	that	the	use	of	language	as	a	conveyor	
of	our	truths	must	extend	to	God.	Contrary	to	the	philosophy	of	the	
sceptics,	if	a	religious	experience	is	conceived	as	true	it	is	commonsense	
to	accept	it	as	such.	As	we	perceive	colours	in	other	sense	experiences	
which	we	 translate	 into	 linguistic	 descriptions	which	we	 can	 share	
with	 others,	 so	 likewise	we	 can	 share	 our	 knowledge	 of	God	with	
others in the confidence that the veracity of what we are saying will at 
the	least	be	respected	and	at	best	believed.
So	large	a	share	has	belief	in	our	intellectual	operations,	in	our	
active	principles,	and	in	our	actions	themselves,	that,	as	faith	
in	things	divine	is	represented	as	the	mainspring	in	the	life	of	
a	Christian,	so	belief	in	general	is	the	mainspring	in	the	life	of	
man.13
Or	 does	 Reid	 acknowledge	 the	 complications	 of	 understanding	
belief?
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The	manner	in	which	a	man	who	sees,	discerns	so	many	things	
by	means	of	 the	 eye,	 is	 as	 unintelligible	 to	 the	 blind,	 as	 the	
manner	 in	which	a	man	may	be	 inspired	with	knowledge	by	
the	Almighty,	is	to	us.14
In	 other	 words,	 all	 manner	 and	 means	 of	 perception	 are	 worthy	
of	 respect	 and	 understanding,	 even	 although	 we	 may	 not	 always	
understand	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 object	 of	 perception.	 Reid	 accepts	 as	
given	 our	 abilities	 to	 build	 experiences	 and	 beliefs	 which	 may	 be	
translated	into	language.	
Wolterstorff	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 his	 book	Thomas Reid and the 
Story of Epistemology	notes	that	Reid	emphasises	the	fact	that	belief	
of	 any	kind	 involves	 judgement.	 For	 a	 belief	 to	 be	 convincing	 and	
coherent	a	person	must	use	his	common	sense	judgement	to	make	a	
convincing	case	for	that	belief.	Wolterstorff	writes:	
…	 does	 Common	 Sense	 consist	 of	 propositions	 judged	 or	
believed	 by	 human	 beings	 in	 common,	 with	 a	 particular	
principle	of	Common	Sense	being	 some	 item	 in	 that	 totality	
of	 shared	 beliefs?	Or	 –	 here’s	 yet	 a	 third	 possibility	 –	 does	
Common	Sense	consist	of	those	shared	faculties	that	produce	
beliefs	we	all	share	in	common?15
In	 response	 to	Wolterstorff	 two	 questions	may	 be	 prompted.	 First,	
is	 language	 the	means	 by	 which	 we	 formulate	 beliefs	 in	 so	 far	 as	
their	existence	depends	upon	social	intercourse?	If	we	are	unable	to	
communicate our beliefs to others they remain untried figments of 
our	imagination	and	as	untested	beliefs	they	cannot	be	the	subject	of	
common	sense.	This	 latter	point	 leads	 to	 the	second	question.	Does	
Wolterstorff	 imply	 that	 for	 Reid	 beliefs	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 the	
judgement	of	men	and	women	must	have	some	universal	truth	because	
of	the	route	of	common	sense	which	they	have	travelled?	
For	Reid,	beliefs	in	a	deity	are	entered	into	wilfully	and	must	be	
coherent	if	they	are	to	be	convincing	in	social	intercourse.	He	believes	
that	by	common	sense,	people	are	able	 to	construct	sensible	beliefs	
which	are	real	and	beyond	the	scrutiny	of	sceptics.	These	beliefs	are	
real	as	long	as	people	have	the	ability	to	argue	that	they	are	true	and	
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valid.	Reid’s	argument	gives	us	a	warrant	to	accept	the	reality	of	belief	
and	by	so	doing	to	assume	the	nature	of	the	reality	which	the	individual	
understands	and	is	prepared	to	defend	in	public	discourse.	
Third,	a	speech	act	is	mainly	assumed	to	be	invalid	if	it	is	addressed	
to	 a	 vacuous	 body.	However,	 we	 can	 now	 see	 that	 any	 speech	 act	
offered	in	a	prayer	to	God	has	reality	and	meaning	for	the	person	or	
congregation	uttering	it.	To	them,	their	speech	is	real	and	the	receptor	
is	 also	 real.	 To	 speak	 to	 God	 is	 absolutely	 coherent	 to	 those	 who	
believe	that	such	communication	is	possible	and	may	indeed	result	in	
a	reply.	Thus	we	come	to	speech	acts	themselves:	Reid	suggests	that	
language	 is	a	characteristic	of	social	 intercourse	and	must	 therefore	
be	affective	in	certain	transactions.	Man	cannot	live	without	language	
which	he	uses	very	often	as	speech	acts:
…	he	would	still	be	a	solitary	being,	even	when	in	a	crowd;	
it	would	 be	 impossible	 for	 him	 to	 put	 a	 question,	 or	 give	 a	
command,	to	ask	a	favour,	or	testify	a	fact,	to	make	a	promise	
or	a	bargain.16
Theologians	would	probably	argue	that	prayer	is	meant	to	be	altruistic	
but	 very	 often	 ‘vulgar’	 prayer	 does	 appeal	 to	 one’s	 baser	 instincts.	
‘If	you	grant	me	success	in	business,	Lord,	I	will	repay	you	in	years	
of	 service.’	 Such	 a	 bargain	 can	 be	made	 in	 prayer	 and	 is	 precisely	
the kind of act which Reid identifies above. Nevertheless, prayer can 
also	be	a	testimony	of	faith	or	a	promise.	It	is	possible	to	stretch	the	
correlation	between	speech	act	and	the	above	quotation	and	prayer	a	
little	too	far	but	it	is	obvious	that	all	profound	prayer	can	be	real	if	our	
understanding	of	Reid	is	correct.	
Thus	 we	 have	 the	 three	 elements	 of	 Reid’s	 understanding	 of	
language	which	 leads	 to	 a	 common	 sense	 acceptance	 of	 the	 reality	
of	a	conversation	conducted	in	prayer.	But	is	it	possible	to	take	this	a	
stage	further?	It	has	been	argued	that	one	of	the	surprising	features	of	
postmodern	theology	is	the	rediscovery	of	Karl	Barth.17	In	one	of	the	
volumes	of	his	Church Dogmatics,	he	writes:	‘Knowledge	of	God	is	
obedience	to	God.’18
Barth	 is	 stating	a	very	succinct	view	of	 the	 internalist	argument	
of	 Reid.	 He	 is	 suggesting	 that	 God	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 after	
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knowledge	of	his	existence	 is	gleaned	 from	 the	Bible.	 It	 is	not	any	
God	that	is	demanding	obedience	but	the	coherent	God	which,	Barth	
assumes,	can	be	found	in	the	Bible	with	its	story	of	God’s	revelation.	
There	are	several	genres	of	discourse	which	can	be	used	for	describing	
a	religious	experience	or	belief.	The	two	most	important	are	theology	
and	prayer.	They	give	the	believer	the	opportunity	to	put	into	coherent	
words	 descriptions	 of	 their	 beliefs.	 Prayer	 is	 uniquely	 different	 in	
that	an	attempt	is	being	made	to	communicate	with	God.	Theology	is	
communication	about.	It	is	the	unique	position	of	prayer	which	gives	
rise	to	the	problems	surrounding	speech	acts.	We	hope	that	in	this	paper,	
we	have	shown	that	speech	addressed	to	God	is	both	real	and	rational	
and may be verified by the very reality of the belief and awe in which 
God	may	be	held.	As	Robinson	puts	it,	‘For	Reid,	as	for	James,	belief	
is	the	prelude	to	activity,	including	that	of	an	intellectual	or	conceptual	
nature’	and	that	activity	must	inevitably	involve	language.19
The	language	of	prayer	can	involve	very	real	speech	acts.	Promises	
are regularly made to God, promises of obedience and of fidelity. 
God is glorified in doxologies, and this is tantamount to investing 
extravagant	descriptions	of	his	being	and	acts	in	forms	which	may	only	
be	seen	as	true	statements	when	the	coherence	of	belief	is	understood	
and	formulated.	
Thomas	Reid	believed	in	the	reality	of	God	and	also	in	the	viability	
and	veracity	of	belief.	He	wrote:	
Of	Truths	that	relate	to	Existence	none	are	Necessary	but	those	
which affirm the Existence and Attributes of the Deity all other 
Existences	 depend	 upon	Will	&	 therefore	 are	 not	 necessary.	
Those	 truths	 that	 relate	 to	 the	 Existence	 of	 a	 Deity	 are	 not	
perhaps to be reckoned first truths but consequences from them 20
In	 this	 quotation,	 Reid	 suggests	 that	 our	 beliefs	 and	 understanding	
of	 the	Deity	 depend	 upon	 our	will	 and	 judgement.	The	 beliefs	 are	
formed	 from	our	understanding	of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	 and	of	our	
general	experience.	When	we	choose	to	worship	God	through	prayer	
we	verbalise	our	understanding	of	God	in	relation	to	the	world	and	by	
so	doing	may	make	utterances	which	are	tantamount	to	speech	acts.	
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These	 involve	 us	 in	 some	 of	 the	 strongest	 expressions	 of	 our	 faith	
by	committing	us	to	serve	God	through	our	promises,	covenants	and	
expressions	of	devotion.
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